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Presidents and policy analysts are periodically seized with a passion
to reform the nation’s welfare system. This passion occasionally results
in a serious proposal for thorough reform, such as President Nixon’s
Family Assistance Plan, President Carter’s Program for Better Jobs and
Income, or President Reagan’s New Federalism. The only reform pro-
posal that has received experimental scrutiny, however, is a suggestion
advanced by academic economists--the negative income tax or
guaranteed annual income plan. While popular among economists, the
negative income tax proposal has never attracted much enthusiasm--or
even attention--among politicians and voters. Fortunately, the findings
from the negative income tax experiments are relevant to a wide variety
of reform proposals, including the plans suggested by recent Presidents.
Experimental results were used, in fact, to predict the behavioral conse-
quences of both the Nixon and the Carter reform proposals. This essay
summarizes the labor supply findings from the four negative income tax
experiments and considers their implications for reforming the
American welfare system.
It is useful at the start to distinguish among three different kinds of
labor supply estimates that have been produced by the experiments.
The first was obtained by measuring the simple difference between the
work effort of people who were assigned to experimental negative in-
come tax plans and that of people who were assigned to the control
group. Those in the control group were not eligible to receive payments
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and so were presumably unaffected by the experiment. The labor supply
difference between these two groups is ordinarily expressed as a reduc-
tion in average hours of work per week or as a percentage change in
comparison to the average hours worked by members of the control
group.
A second type of estimate is produced by using structural models of
work effort response. Structural models yield a decomposition of the
overall work reduction into a change that is due to the net wage or tax
change, on the one hand, and one that is due to the increase in family in-
come, on the other. These two separate effects are referred to as the
substitution and income effects, respectively. Economists usually prefer
this type of measure of response for two reasons. It permits the results
of the experiments to be directly compared with labor supply findings
from nonexperimental studies. And it allows analysts to generalize the
findings from the experiments to a much wider population than the one
enrolled in the experiment and to estimate the effects of a broader range
of plans than the ones actually tested in the experiment. The latter ad-
vantage is particularly important from the point of view of evaluating
realistic reform proposals, since no plan suggested by congressmen or
Presidents has borne much resemblance to the ones tested in the ex-
periments.
The third kind of estimate of response is generated using micro-
economic simulation. This type of estimate is simply a generalization of
the results from an experiment to the national population. Using
estimates of the income and substitution effects obtained in an experi-
ment and a microeconomic census file representing all U.S. households,
economists have predicted the response of low-income workers to alter-
native income maintenance tax plans and summed these responses to
produce an estimate of the effect on national labor supply.
From a scientific viewpoint the most reliable estimate of work reduc-
tion is the simple difference in labor supply between members of the
treatment and control groups. This is the measure of response that the
experiments were specifically designed to produce and it is the one that
has been most widely reported in the popular press. It is inherently
more difficult to decompose the overall response into income and
substitution effects, although in this respect the experiments possess
substantial advantages over nonexperimental sources of data. The ex-
perimentally based simulations of national response are more problem-
atical. National simulations are based on a specific (and perhaps erro-
neous) decomposition of the experimental response into income and
substitution effects and on detailed assumptions about the responses of
subpopulations that were unrepresented or poorly represented in the
experiments.




Description of the Negative Income Tax Experiments
Characteristics of the sample Characteristics of the plans
Range of
Sample Income Range of Tax rates Range of
Size Family Composition         Race Truncationa Duration Guaranteea (percent) Breakevena
1,357 Husband-wife (100%)       White (32%) 150 3 years 50 to 125 30 to 70 100 to 250
Black (37%)
Hispanic (31%)
Rural 809 Husband-wife (85%) White (65%) 150 3 years 50 to 100 30 to 70 100 to 250
-(1969-1973) Single female parent (15%) Black (35%)
Gary 1,780 Husband-wife (41%) Black (100%) Noneb 3 years 77 and 10! 40 and 60 128 to 253
(1971-1974) Single female parent (59%)
Seattle-Denver 4,800 Husband-wife (61%) White (39%) 325 3 years (71%) 92 to 135 50 and 70 140 to 300
(197!-1982) Single female parent (39%) Black (43%) 5 years (25%) 70-.0025Yc
Hispanic (18%) 20 years (4%) 80-.0025Yc
aMeasured as a percent of the poverty line. Breakeven is the income level at Which the negative income tax payment is reduced to zero. Partial reimbursement
of income and payroll taxes was phased out at higher income levels.
bThe Gary sample was initially restricted to families with incomes below 240% of the poverty level, but a small sample with incomes above this limit was
subsequently enrolled to minimize truncation bias.
CDeclining marginal tax rate plans. Y is family income, implying that the marginal tax rate declined by 2.5 percentage points with every $1.000 increase in income.
Sources: Committee on Finance, U.S, Senate (1978). p. 316. Kehrer (1977). and Robins (1985).THE WORK RESPONSE 25
three kinds of estimates of response would rank in the reverse order.
The average difference in labor supply between treatment and control
groups within a particular experiment may be suggestive, but it is not
especially helpful for predicting the effect of a realistic welfare reform
plan on a representative population. The most useful and meaningful
estimates of response are ones that reflect the response of a nationally
representative sample to a plausible program of reform. Unfortunately,
such estimates are inherently the least reliable.
The remainder of this paper considers, in turn, the three kinds of
estimates just described and their major limitations. The paper con-
cludes with a discussion of the implications of the estimates for welfare
policymaking.
Simple Estimates of ResPonse
The negative income tax experiments produced a large number of
estimates of average response to the tested plans. These estimates
naturally vary across the four experiments, since the experiments tested
different plans on different populations. Table 1 describes some of the
main features of the samples and negative income tax plans tested in the
experiments.
The samples varied tremendously in the different experiments. The
first experiment, in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, enrolled low-income
black, white, and Hispanic residents of declining urban areas. All of the
enrolled families originally contained both husband and wife. The Rural
experiment, which was conducted in Iowa and North Carolina, con-
tained low-income rural families. Although most of the families contained
both a husband and a wife, a small number of single-parent families
were also enrolled. The two later experiments, in Gary, Indiana, and in
Seattle and Denver, enrolled higher income samples drawn from low-
income census tracts in large midwestern and western central cities. The
samples in these experiments were purposefully drawn to represent
single-parent as well as two-parent families. The Gary experiment was
restricted to black families, while the Seattle-Denver experiment includ-
ed large samples of white and Chicano, as well as black, families. Clearly,
the differences in the samples are important enough so that significant
differences might be expected in the average response even if each of the
experiments had tested an identical set of plans.
The tested negative income tax plans were not identical, however.
On average, the New Jersey, Rural, and Gary experiments tested less
generous plans than the ones tried in Seattle and Denver. That is, the
Seattle-Denver plans offered more generous payments to families
without other income and provided payments to families at higher in-Table 2
Changes in Hours and Earnings in Four Negative Income Tax Experiments
(Percentage changes in parentheses)
Husbands
Hours Hours
Experiment per year Annual earningsa per year
New Jersey
White -99 (-5.6) +10 (+0.1) -73 (-30.6)
Black +36 (+2.3) +1,180 (+9.3) -5 (-2.2)
HisDanic -10 (-0.7) +800 (+6.4) -99 (-55.4)
Allu -21 (-1.2) +690 (+5.3) -56 (-24.6)
Ruralc
White +40 (+1.8) -590 (-4.8) -88 (-21.1)
Black -152 (-8.0) -630 (-6.8) -268 (-31.3)
All -56 (-2.8) -610 (-5.7) -178 (-27.9)
Gary
Black          -114 (-6.5)      -830 (-5.0)    +14 (+5.0)
Seattle-Denver
White -144 (-7.6) -1,310 (-7.5) -107 (-17.1)
Black -169 (-9.5) -930 (-5.9) -153 (-16.0)
Hispanic -231 (-11.5) -510 (-3.0) -147 (-28.7)
All -164 (-8.8) -1,070 (-6.4) -128 (-17.9)
3-yearSample -133 (-7.1) -810 (-4.8) -101 (-14.2)
Weighted averaged -119 (-7.0) -650 (-4.0) -93 (-17.0)
Wives
Annual earningsa
Single female heads of families
Hours








+160 (+10.5) -!12 (-30.0) -280 (-13.9)
-590 (-16.5) -85 (-8.6) -900 (-13.9)
-860 (-15.6) -180 (-16.6) -980 (-14.0)
-800 (-32.5) -202 (-20.4) -1,380 (-22.3)
-710 (-17.6) -144 (-14.0) -1,000 (-14.9)
-580 (-14.4) -134 (-13.0) -940 (-14.1)
-480 (-16.0) -133 (-17.0) -760 (-15.0)
aAnnual earnings changes are measured in 1985 dollars. Earnings estimates reported in original reports were converted using the personal consumption expenditure
deflator.
bResults for overall New Jersey response are obtained by weighting responses of separate racial groups. Racial weights are reported in Table 1.
CResults for Rural response are obtained by weighting of separately reported responses for white wage earners in Iowa (25% of sample), white wage earners in North
Carolina (25%), and black wage earners in North Carolina (50%).
dSeparate responses are weighted using reported estimation samples in four experiments. For husbands and wives, New Jersey = 0.20; Rural = 0.07; Gary = 0.17; Seattle-
Denver = 0.56. For female heads, Gary = 0.34, and Seattle-Denver = 0.66.
Sources: New Jersey: Rees (1974), pp. 174-75; Rural: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1976), pp. 23 and 29; Gary: Moffitt (1979), p. 482, and Greenberg,
Moffitt, and Friedman (1981), p. 586; Seattle-Denver: SRI International (1983), pp. 120-22 (second experimental year results) and Robins and West (1980b), pp. 16, 19,
22, and 59-67.THE WORK RESPONSE 27
come levels. Thus, other things equal, we would expect the Seattle-
Denver plans to induce a larger response. Other things were not equal,
however. I have already mentioned differences in the income distribu-
tions of the four samples. In addition, the nonexperimental welfare
benefits available to members of the control group differed across the ex-
periments. Local labor market conditions also differed. There is thus no
reason to expect that the average response to the income maintenance
plans would be identical across experiments.
Table 2 shows the average work effort and earnings reductions
within various subsamples of the four experiments. The estimates are
taken from the final reports of each of the experiments. Analysts essen-
tially estimated a statistical model of the following type:
(1) Y = ~ +/~T + ~,Z + 6X + e,
where Y is the dependent variable of interest (either hours of work or
earnings), T is a treatment dummy variable that takes the value one for
people assigned to any of the negative income tax plans and zero for
members of the control group, Z is a vector of variables originally used
to stratify the sample in the experimental design (for example, pre-
experimental income level), and X is a set of personal characteristics
believed to affect the dependent variable (age, educational attainment,
place of residence, and so forth). The treatment effect is/J, and it cap-
tures the average effect of treatment on an average member of the sam-
ple assigned to negative income tax plans.1
Most but not all of the entries in table 2 are negative, implying that
the negative income tax plans caused reductions in work effort and earn-
ings for most subsamples enrolled in the experiments. All of the entries
for the Seattle-Denver experiment are negative and, especially for men,
are often larger than corresponding entries from the other three ex-
periments. Virtually all of the Seattle-Denver estimates are significantly
different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level, whereas estimates
from the other experiments are frequently insignificant. There are two
explanations for this pattern. As mentioned above, the average gener-
osity of the Seattle-Denver plans was greater than that of the plans
tested in the other experiments, causing a larger response, and the
sample enrolled in Seattle-Denver was much larger, yielding a smaller
standard error around the point estimate of response.28 Gary Burtless
The bottom row in table 2 shows average hours and earnings reduc-
tions in all of the experiments for husbands and wives in two-parent
families and female heads of single-parent families. Husbands reduced
their reported work effort by approximately 7 percent, while wives and
female heads reduced reported hours by 17 percent. The greater respon-
siveness of women than of men is consistent with the relative labor sup-
ply elasticities reported in nonexperimental studies. Analysts of the
Gary and Seattle-Denver experiments concluded that most of the hours
reduction was caused by shorter durations of employment and by
longer durations of unemployment and labor force withdrawal among
people enrolled in the negative income tax plans.2 There was only a
comparatively small effect on the weekly hours of those remaining at
work.
On balance, the proportional reductions in earnings were quite close
to the reductions in hours. Although the earnings reductions might
appear to be relatively modest, they are sizable when compared with the
negative income tax payment received by a typical family. In the Seattle-
Denver experiment, for example, eligible two-parent families received
transfer payments that were $2,700 larger than the nonexperimental
payments sent to members of the control group.3 The combined earn-
ings reduction of husbands and wives in the Seattle-Denver treatment
group was almost $1,800, or approximately two-thirds of the net experi-
mental payment. The average tax rate of the Seattle-Denver plans was
about 50 percent, implying that the $1,800 earnings reduction caused
payments to be $900 above what they would have been in the absence of
a work effort response. Thus, one-third of the net transfer cost of the
Seattle-Denver plan was due to the reductions in reported earnings
among participants. Another way to interpret the same set of figures is
to say that the experiment spent nearly $2,700 on transfers and succeed-
ed in raising the incomes of two-parent families by only $900.4 Even if
the earnings reductions are taken to be modest, it is reasonable to asl.~
whether most taxpayers would be willing to spend $3 in order to raise
the incomes of poor, two-parent families by only $1.
Several analysts have found evidence that at least part of the
employment and earnings reduction reported in the experiments was
spurious. Recipients of negative income tax payments had a clear incen-
tive to underreport their employment and earnings, because to do so
permitted them to receive a larger payment than the one to which they
were legally entitled. Wage earners enrolled in the control group did not
face this kind of misreporting incentive.
It is possible to analyze this issue with sufficiently accurate employ-
ment and earnings data which are not subject to reporting bias. The
employment and earnings records of the unemployment insurance
system provide one source of such data. The effects of underreportingTHE WORK RESPONSE 29
were systematically examined using these data in two of the experi-
ments, Gary and Seattle-Denver. In both experiments underreporting
was found to bias the estimates of employment and earnings response.
The bias in the Gary experiment was large enough so that the entire
earnings response and much of the apparent employment effect of the
experiment disappeared,s In the case of the Seattle-Denver experiment
the bias was somewhat smaller and less reliably estimated. Husbands
and women heading single-parent families misreported their employ-
ment and earnings infrequently enough so that the response estimates
reported in table 2 are. probably only slightly overstated. On the other
hand, the responses of wives and other secondary earners are greatly
overstated.6 The earnings reduction of wives, for example, virtually
disappears when the response estimate is based on presumably accurate
data from the unemployment insurance system. Of course, even if
misreporting bias causes an exaggeration of the efficiency loss from a
negative income tax, there is no reason for complacency about the earn-
ings reductions reported in table 2. An earnings reduction caused by
underreporting is just as costly to taxpayers as a reduction caused by a
genuine reduction in work effort.
Offsetting the bias from misreporting is the effect of the limited
duration of the experiments. There are at least two reasons to believe
that a limited duration income maintenance program will elicit a smaller
response than a permanent program that offers the same income
guarantee and tax rate. The first is that workers may need time to re-
spond to the incentives embedded in an income maintenance plan. If
they are given only three years to respond, as they were in the experi-
ments, their eventual response might not be fully observed. A second
reason to expect a small response is that the income effect produced by a
limited-duration program is by definition less than the income effect
produced by an otherwise equivalent program which is expected to be
permanent. A $1,000-per-year payment should cause a larger effect if it
is to last indefinitely than if it is to continue only three years, unless the
worker applies an extremely high discount rate to future income. On the
other hand, because the experiments were temporary they essentially
offered a sale on leisure, which participants were forced to take advan-
tage of within a concentrated period. This encouraged greater respon-
siveness than would have been observed in a permanent program.
The Seattle-Denver experiment is the only one that permits us to
examine the effects of limited duration in a reasonably satisfactory way.
About 30 percent of the eligible sample in that experiment was enrolled
for five years, while the remainder was enrolled for three years.7 The
pattern of response of families in both the five-year and three-year
groups suggests that workers were somewhat slow in reacting to the
negative income tax disincentives. Robins and West (1980b, p. 36)30 Gary Burtless
estimate that 90 percent of the full response would only be observed
after 2.4 years in the case of husbands, after 3.6 years in the case of
wives, and after 4.5 years in the case of single women with dependent
children.
The same authors also find that the average response of husbands
and wives (though not of single women) in the five-year treatment
group was substantially greater than that in the three-year group, even
when the responses of the two groups are measured at the same point in
time (for example, two years after enrollment). The maximum response
of husbands in the five-year group occurred in the third and fourth years
of the experiment, when the hours reduction was 13 percent and the
earnings reduction approximately 12 percent (Robins and West, 1980b,
p. 23). These reductions are about twice the magnitude of responses in
the three-year group during the second year. The maximum response
for wives in the five-year group occurred in the fourth and fifth years,
when the hours reduction was 27 percent and the earnings reduction 26
percent (Robins and West, 1980b, p. 25). For single women heading
families, the maximum response occurred in the fifth year, when the
hours reduction was 32 percent and the earnings reduction about 35 per-
cent (Robins and West, 1980b, p. 27).
Clearly, the sluggishness of the labor supply response and the at-
tenuated response to a shorter duration plan cause the long-term impact
of a permanent negative income tax to be substantially understated by
the mid-experimental responses of families assigned to three-year plans.
It should be stressed, however, that this conclusion is valid only for the
relatively generous, low-tax plans tested in Seattle-Denver. Plans with
high tax rates might have elicited a different pattern of response.
Burtless and Greenberg (1982) found evidence that participants in the
experiment, particularly women, reacted more strongly to the tax rates
than they would have in a program of permanent duration. Taking ad-
vantage of the sale on leisure, participants in the three-year plans were
significantly more responsive to the tax than were participants in the
five-year plans. If a high-tax, low-guarantee plan had been tested, it is
conceivable that the overall response of the three-year treatment group
would have been larger, not smaller, than that of the five-year group.
The implications of table 2 may be summarized briefly. The four
negative income tax experiments caused moderate to large proportional
reductions in work effort. As expected, the proportional response was
greater among women than men. The absolute reductions were largest
in the Seattle-Denver experiment, which offered the most generous
plans, and were smaller and less precisely estimated in the experiments
testing plans with a lower income guarantee and breakeven point. The
work effort reductions were overstated due to misreporting bias but
understated because of the limited duration of the experiments, par-THE WORK RESPONSE 31
ticularly in the case of high-guarantee, low-tax-rate plans. On balance,
the experiments probably underestimated the permanent response to a
negative income tax program with a generous guarantee (equal, for
example, to the poverty line) and a relatively low tax rate (equal to or
below 50 percent). It is less certain that the effect of low-guarantee, high-
tax negative income tax plans would be understated in a short-duration
experiment.
Even if we had perfect confidence in our estimates of average
response, it is not clear how they could be used to predict the conse-
quences of reform plans in which policymakers are actually interested.
The Seattle-Denver experiment produced the most precise results and
the ones that have been subject to the most thorough sensitivity
analysis. But those results were obtained in an experiment in which the
average negative income tax plan provided a guaranteed income of
about 115 percent of the poverty line and taxed earned income at a
marginal rate of approximately 50 percent. No feasible welfare reform
plan could offer universal benefits this generous. The maximum com-
bined benefit from aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) and
food stamps is now only 73 percent of the poverty line in the median
state and is equal to the poverty line in only the most generous state.
The gross income limit for receiving benefits from AFDC is less than
twice the poverty line in all but two states and below 1.5 times the
poverty line in 37 states.8 By contrast, over half of the families in the
Seattle-Denver experiment were enrolled in plans with an income break-
even above twice the poverty level, and 86 percent were enrolled in
plans with a breakeven above 1.5 times the poverty line.9 Thus, not only
were transfers quite generous in the Seattle-Denver experiment, ’they
were available to families well up in the income distribution. For these
reasons, the average recorded response to the Seattle-Denver plans does
not provide a useful approximation of the expected response to plausi-
ble programs of welfare reform.
Structural Models of Response
Because estimates of the average negative income tax response are
difficult to use, economists analyzing the experiments have sought to
obtain structural estimates of response. We can distinguish between two
broad classes of structural models. The first emphasizes the response
within an experiment to the separate negative income tax plan
characteristics--the income guarantee and the tax rate. The second em-
phasizes the individual-level response to unearned income and net
wage levels more generally, or to changes in these two variables induced
by the experiment.32 Gary B u rtless
At first blush, the first type of estimate might appear to be the
easiest to produce and then apply in predicting the effects of income
maintenance alternatives. To estimate the separate responses to income
guarantees and tax rates, the analyst simply estimates equation (1) but
replaces the variable T with a set of variables that reflect the level of the
experimental guarantee, the marginal tax rate, and possibly some in-
teraction between these two program features. For example, if the ex-
periment tested a low, moderate, and high guarantee and a low,
moderate, and high tax, with complete interaction of the guarantee and
tax, a simple way to represent the treatment is:
(2) H = ~ +/91T +/~2 (AG) +/~3 (At) + TZ + 6X + e,
where T is again a variable for assignment to experimental treatment,
/kG is the dollar difference between the individual’s assigned guarantee
and the lowest guarantee tested, and ~t is the percentage-point dif-
ference between the assigned tax rate and the lowest tax rate tested. (~G
and ~t both take the value zero for control observations and individuals
assigned to the low-guarantee, low-tax plan.) With this specification,
is interpreted as the average effect of the low-guarantee, low-tax pro-
gram,/32 is the average effect of a one-dollar rise in guarantee, and/33 is
the effect of a one-point rise in the tax rate. More complicated interaction
effects of the guarantee and tax can also be specified. The expected
effects of an alternative negative income tax plan can be predicted using
the estimates of/31,/~2, and/~3 and suitably defining T, ~G, and ixt to
represent accurately the alternative plan.
This approach to estimation, although straightforward, is less useful
than it first appears. The samples enrolled in the experiments were not
nationally representative, so the estimates of /3,, /~2, and /~3 will not
necessarily be valid if applied to a wider population. For example, the
average effect of a low-guarantee, low-tax plan, /~,, depends on the
generosity of the welfare system against which it is compared. The plan
might be expected to cause little work reduction in a state like
Washington, where AFDC benefits are high, but significant reductions
in Indiana, where the maximum payment for such aid is extremely low.
Since the experiments did not enroll samples that faced a representative
set of state welfare programs, it is not clear how estimates of/tl,/J2, and
can be used to predict work effort responses in states where no experi-
ment was conducted.
A more subtle problem arises because of the sampling design used
to assign families to negative income tax treatments. The experiments
did not use simple random assignment. The potential sample in each ex-
periment was divided into subsamples defined by a set of stratifying
variables. One important stratifying variable was preexperimental in-
come level. The Seattle-Denver experiment, for example, divided theTHE WORK RESPONSE 33
sample into seven preexperimental income classes. Families within each
income class were randomly assigned to one of the tested plans or to
control status. The proportion assigned to a specific plan was not iden-
tical in each income class, however. In order to increase the number of
families that could be enrolled given a fixed budget constraint, the ex-
periments enrolled a higher proportion of low-income families into the
least generous plans and a higher proportion of high-income families
into the most generous plans. The income distribution of families
assigned to the most generous plans was consequently not the same as
that of families assigned to the least generous plans. This implies that
the differences in average work effort response to two different plans in
the same experiment may be due to differences in the composition of the
samples assigneq to the plans as well as to genuine differences in
response induced by the plans.1° This problem could be avoided in
estimation by fully interacting the negative income tax plan parameters
with the stratifying variables, but such a procedure is extremely cumber-
some and yields statistically imprecise results.11 No published study
from the experiments relies on this approach. When analysts have
estimated structural models of response to the income guarantee and tax
rate, they have not estimated all of the interaction terms that would per-
mit us to disentangle the effect of the sampling plan from that of the
treatments themselves.
In a second approach to estimation, economists have specified labor
supply models quite similar to those estimated with nonexperimental
data. A model of this type was estimated by Keeley et al. (1978b) using
data from the Seattle-Denver experiment:
where Aw is the change in the after-tax wage rate caused by an in-
dividual’s assigned negative income tax plan and AY is the change in
after-tax income. Both Aw and AY are computed at the individual’s
preexperimental level of work effort, Hp. Obviously, Aw and Ay will
vary widely even among individuals facing the same negative income
tax plan. Under the usual assumptions we would expect/11 to be positive
and//2 to be negative. That is, increases in the net wage, holding income
constant, should cause individual labor supply to rise, while increases in
income, holding the net wage constant, should reduce labor supply. The
Keeley et al. specification is similar to one estimated with nonex-
perimental data and proposed by Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974). Like
Keeley et al., Burtless and Hausman (1978) estimated a model that could
be applied as easily to nonexperimental as to experimental data:
(4)    log (H) = o: + f!l w + fl2N + ~X + ~,
where w is the after-tax wage rate and N is the virtual income intercept34 Gary Burtless
Table 3
Estimates of Substitution and Income Elasticities
from Experimental and Nonexperimental Studies
Uncompensated Compensated
Substitution Substitution Total Income
Subjects Elasticitya Elasticityb Elasticity
Men
Negative Income Tax IN = 21 ]c .0043 .0795 - .0757
(.098) (.Q68) (.09%
Weighted Negative
Income Tax -.0223 .0902 -.1139
Nonexperimental [N = 26]c -. 1045 .2842 - .3873
(. 178) (.415) (.339)
Women
Negative Income







IN =14]c .0957 .1907 -.0957




Tax Female Heads IN = 11]c
Weighted Negative
Income Tax
Nonexperimental IN = 48]c
Nonexperimentale IN = 38tc
.1730 .2425 -.0696
-.0373 .1346 -.1709











CNumber of separate estimates of response used to compute the reported elasticity.
dExcludes estimates from the New Jersey experiment.
eExcludes five estimates showing the highest compensated substitution elasticity and five
estimates showing the lowest compensated substitution elasticity.
Sources: See text.THE WORK RESPONSE 35
measured at an individual’s desired hours of work.12 For low-wage
workers, it is reasonable to expect/3~ to be positive and//2 to be negative.
A cynic might ask why it is necessary to invest $100 million collect-
ing experimental data when analysts then estimate models that could as
easily be estimated using nonexperimental data. While the question is a
legitimate one, it has a straightforward answer. The experimental varia-
tion in tax rates and income guarantees produces a large amount of
essentially random variation in Aw and zXY and in w and N, the critical
variables in equations (3) and (4). The variation is not totally random, of
course, because these variables are correlated with a worker’s gross
wage rate and may be correlated with preexperimental work effort and
other confounding variables through the effects of the negative income
tax plan assignment procedure, discussed above.13 But in spite of this
correlation, random assignment of workers to widely differing negative
income tax plans assures us that a greater fraction of the variation in zXw,
zXY, w,and N will be independent of observed and unobserved variables
that affect H.14 From a statistical standpoint, this should increase our
confidence in the resulting coefficient estimates.
A large number of structural models have been estimated using data
from the negative income tax experiments, particularly the Seattle-
Denver experiment. Moffit and Kehrer (1981, pp. 138-42) and Robins
(1985, p. 578) have reported individual and average estimates of income
and substitution effects obtained in each of the negative income tax ex-
periments. Table 3 presents a summary of income and substitution
elasticities, averaged across the four experiments. These estimates of
response in the New Jersey, Rural, and Gary experiments are based
upon corrected estimates of elasticities reported by Moffitt and Kehrer
(1981). Estimates for the Seattle-Denver experiment are based on the
simple average of elasticities reported in seven separate studies using
data from that experiment.~5 Table 3 shows the average experimental
estimates of the (uncompensated) net wage elasticity, the compensated
substitution elasticity, and the total income elasticity for husbands,
wives, and female household heads. The substitution elasticities are
useful in indicating the slope of the labor supply function and the rough
magnitude of efficiency losses arising from imposition of higher tax rates
on low-wage workers. The total income elasticity shows the percentage
by which work effort falls with a one percentage point rise in income
that is not accompanied by a change in the net wage rate.
Average elasticity estimates for the experiments were computed in
two different ways. First, the simple arithmetic average of all of the
estimates from separate studies of labor supply response was calculated.
The top row in the table, for example, shows the simple average of 21
separate estimates of the labor supply elasticity for husbands enrolled in
the experiments.16 In parentheses below these elasticity averages the36 Gary Burtless
table shows the standard deviation of the different point estimates of
response around the average estimate. A more defensible way to com~
pute the mean response is to account for the relative size of the samples
used to obtain different elasticity estimates. It seems reasonable, for
example, to attach a lower weight to the estimated elasticity within a
sample of 200 New Jersey Hispanics than we attach to the response of
2,200 white, black, and Hispanic husbands in Seattle and Denver. A
weighted estimate of the average elasticity was derived using a two-step
procedure. First the average elasticity within each of the four negative
income tax experiments was computed, and then the weighted average
elasticity was calculated by suitably weighting the measured responses
in the four experiments. (Weights are reported in a footnote to table 2.
Where necessary the responses of separate racial groups within each
experiment were weighted. See the weights reported in table 1.)
It might be argued that the estimates of response from the individual
studies should be weighted by the quality of the research methodology
rather than the size of the estimation sample. This is the implicit strategy
of Borjas and Heckman (1978) in an early survey of the nonexperimental
labor supply literature. Such a survey would yield more interesting and
precise results than those reported here. However, it would also require
thorough justification of the weights attached to the various studies. I
will leave that exercise to others.
It is useful to compare the estimates obtained in the experiments
with labor supply estimates reported in the nonexperimental literature.
Killingsworth (1983) has provided an informative survey of elasticity
estimates obtained in nonexperimental studies. Table 3 contains my
computations of the average and standard deviation of elasticity
estimates reported in 26 nonexperimental studies of U.S. prime-aged
men and 48 studies of U.S. women.17 Because the range of estimates for
women was so large, average female elasticities were computed exclud-
ing the five studies with the highest and the five studies with the lowest
estimates of compensated substitution elasticity.
The labor supply functions estimated with experimental data appear
to be comparatively inelastic. For example, the uncompensated labor
supply function of low-wage men is essentially vertical. A change in the
net wage, holding nonwage income constant, has virtually no effect on
annual male work effort. Even if we consider estimates of the un-
compensated elasticity one standard deviation from the mean estimate,
the elasticity appears to be quite moderate.
The uncompensated substitution elasticity of wives is less reliably
estimated. Although the average estimated elasticity is only -0.04, this
average is sensitive to the method of weighting. When the several
elasticity estimates are weighted according to the size of the estimation
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arises because of the lack of robustness of estimates of wives’ supply
elasticities in the New Jersey experiment. When the New Jersey
estimates are excluded, the mean uncompensated elasticity rises to
0.10-0.17, depending on how the remaining estimates are weighted.
Note that the standard deviation around the unweighted average falls
by more than one-third when New Jersey estimates are excluded. The
relatively large dispersion in estimates of the labor supply of wives was
caused by the income truncation imposed on samples enrolled in the ex-
periments. Since the samples were restricted to very low-income
families, they contained an abnormally small percentage of working
wives. In the experiments with the lowest income limits (New Jersey
and Iowa-North Carolina), the elasticity estimates were sensitive to the
work effort changes of only a handful of women. The elasticity estimates
for men and for women heading single-parent families seem to fall in a
much narrower range than do the estimates for wives.
In comparison to the estimates from the nonexperimental literature,
the elasticity estimates from the experiments tend to be much smaller in
absolute value. This tendency is most pronounced with respect to the
compensated substitution and the income elasticities estimates for men
and, even more strikingly, for the uncompensated and compensated
substitution elasticities for women. Whereas most nonexperimental
estimates show a strongly positive uncompensated supply function for
women, the experiments found only weakly positive or even backward-
bending supply functions. The mean experimental estimates of the
income elasticity for men and women are in the range -0.07 to -0.18.
These estimates are below the average nonexperimental estimates in the
case of men but above the average nonexperimental estimates for
women.
On balance, the experimental estimates imply a smaller respon-
siveness to negative income tax disincentives than do most nonex-
perimental estimates. This conclusion was also reached by Moffitt and
Kehrer (1981) in a survey of the earlier results from the negative income
tax experiments. The average estimates of the compensated substitution
elasticity from the experiments are uniformly lower than the average
elasticities estimated in the nonexperimental literature. Since the
economic efficiency costs of a particular tax or transfer plan are propor-
tional to the compensated substitution effect, it follows that efficiency
loss from a negative income tax was found to be smaller in the ex-
periments than would have been predicted on the basis of the average
elasticity estimated in nonexperimental studies.
Interestingly, the experimental estimates fall in a far narrower range
than the nonexperimental estimates, though the experimental
elasticities were estimated using four independent samples and a wide
range of econometric models. The smaller dispersion in estimates is38 Gary Burtless
obvious from a comparison of the standard deviations around the mean
experimental and nonexperimental point estimates. The greater
robustness of the experimental estimates is presumably due to the large
amount of experimentally induced random variation in net wages and
nonwage income levels. This random variation reduces the effect of
specification error on parameter estimates and thus minimizes the effect
of using alternative econometric models. Even though the average ex-
perimental and nonexperimental elasticity estimates in table 3 are
sometimes far apart, the range of experimental estimates falls well
within the range observed in the nonexperimental literature. Note, for
example, that the average point estimate of response in the experiments
is always within one standard deviation of the corresponding point
estimate from nonexperimental studies. This is, of course, primarily due
to the fact that the standard deviation of nonexperimental estimates is so
large. The experiments thus appear to have achieved their major goal.
They have substantially reduced our uncertainty about the size of work
effort reductions in response to wage rate and income changes.
Implications for Welfare Reform
The labor supply estimates reported in the previous section can be
used to analyze a variety of issues about welfare reform. The most im-
portant issues concern the net budgetary costs and work effort effects of
particular proposals for reform. To predict the detailed effects of a
reform it is necessary to incorporate estimates from a structural labor
supply model into a microsimulation model. In comparison to the large
number of studies of experimental labor supply response, there have
been only few studies attempting to generalize the findings from the
experiments to the U.S. population. Predictions of the nationwide
response to a negative income tax are rare because they are costly to
obtain.
The first requirement for decent prediction is a reliable source of in-
formation about a nationally representative sample of low-income
families. Most sources of data, such as Census public-use tapes or the
Current Population Survey, are expensive to use. A second requirement
for prediction is a computer program that can accurately define or
predict both the pre-reform and post-reform situations of individuals
represented in the Census file. Certain pre-reform characteristics of in-
dividuals, such as employment status, weekly hours of work, annual
earnings, and unearned income, may be directly reported in the file.
Other characteristics, such as taxes paid, potential welfare benefits, and
marginal tax rates, must be predicted on the basis of published tax and
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the United States contains 51 separate political jurisdictions with unique
income tax schedules and welfare formulas, the burden of imputation is
formidable. Using labor supply estimates from the negative income tax
experiments (or some other source), the analyst must finally predict the
amount of work effort change that will occur as a result of a reform in the
transfer formula and calculate the budgetary cost of the reform, taking
account of the labor supply response. Given the size of the computa-
tional burden, it is not surprising that microsimulation is seldom per-
formed.
Table 4 shows predictions of the work effort effects and budgetary
costs of four different negative income tax plans. The predictions are
based on microsimulations performed by SRI International and
Mathematica using estimates of work effort response from the Seattle-
Denver experiment. The table shows the results of two separate simula-
tions of response to each of the plans. The first simulation used popula-
tion information covering the year 1974 and estimates of labor supply
response reported in Keeley et al. (1978b). The second study used
population information for 1975 and estimates of labor supply response
reported in the final Seattle-Denver report (SRI International, 1983).
Note that neither the baseline year nor the assumed labor supply
parameters were the same in the two simulations. (Cost estimates are
converted to 1985 dollars, however.) In addition, other details of the
simulations differed, although the significance of these differences is
difficult to interpret.18
The four negative income tax plans examined in the table offer two
basic payment levels and two tax schedules. The lower income
guarantee is 75 percent of the poverty level while the higher guarantee is
one-third higher, or 100 percent of the poverty line (approximately
$11,000 per year for a family of four in 1985). The plans are assumed to
replace the present public assistance and food stamp programs. The
lower guarantee is slightly more generous than the combined
guarantees of AFDC and food stamps in a state offering the median aid
benefit. However, states offer a wide range of basic aid plus food stamp
payment levels, ranging from less than half to slightly more than the
poverty line.19 The two tax rates examined are 50 percent and 70 per-
cent. By comparison, in the case of AFDC, the statutory tax rate on earn-
ings is now 100 percent, though the statutory rate in the mid-1970s was
only 67 percent. It should be stressed that effective rates have always
been below statutory rates. The effective tax rate for AFDC might cur-
rently approach 70 percent, but in the mid-1970s it was as low as 30 per-
cent (Fraker et al., 1985). The combined AFDC and food stamp effective
tax rate in the mid-1970s was thus below 50 percent. In each of the
negative income tax plans examined, the tax rate on unearned income is
100 percent. Positive income and payroll taxes are fully reimbursed for40 Gary Burtless
families with gross income below the negative income tax breakeven
point. This reimbursement implies that a lO0-percent-of-poverty-line
guarantee assures all families of a net income equal to at least the pover-
ty line.
Table 4
Labor Supply and Budgetary Implications
of Four Negative Income Tax Plans
(1) (2) (3)      (4) (5) (6)
Negative Work Effort Change Percent Net Population
Income Among    In Entire Receiving Additional Earnings
Tax Plan Recipients Population Benefitsa Costb Reductionb (5) + (4)
75% Poverty Line Guarantee/50% Tax Rate
Husband-Wife - 9.5% -1.4% .19 $15.5 $ 9.0 .58
Female Heads - 6.7 -2.4 .61 .8 .4 ,50
Total .24 16.3 9.4 .58
Alternative Estimate
Husband-Wife - 6.5 - .8 .17 11.5 5,1 .44
Female Heads 7.9 9.0 ~57 - 4.8 - 3.0 .62
Total .22 6.7 2.1 .31
75% Poverty Line Guarantee/70% Tax Rate
Husband-Wife -15.8% - .5% ,07 $ 5.5 $ 2,2 .40
Female Heads - 9.3 - 1.2 .51 - 1.0 .0 --
Total .12 4.5 2.2 .49
Alternative Estimate
Husband-Wife - 8.0 .0 .06 1.2 -.7 --
Female Heads 5.2 11.5 ,43 - 6.5 - 3.7 .57
Total .10 - 5.3 - 4.4 .83
100% Poverty Line Guarantee/50% Tax Rate
Husband-Wife - 10,0% - 3,5% .39 $51.9 $27.1 .52
Female Heads -12.0 -7.1 .73 9.2 1,8 .20
Total .43 61.1 28.9 .47
Alternative Estimate
Husband-Wife - 9.8 - 3.4 .39 51.4 26.7 .52
Female Heads - 2.2 1.5 .71 4.1 - .6 --
Total .43 55.5 26.1 .47
100% Poverty Line Guarantee/70% Tax Rate
Husband-Wife -20.6% - 1.5% .15 $19.6 $ 8.6 .44
Female Heads - 14.9 -5.3 .61 6.1 1.0 .16
Total .20 25,7 9.6 .37
Alternative Estimate
Husband-Wife - 10.7 - .9 .14 14.8 5,2 .35
Female Heads - 4,4 5.4 .57 .6 - 1.8 --
Total ,19 15.4 3.4 ,22
apercent of families in relevant population receiving negative income tax payments.
bMeasured in billions of 1985 dollars. A negative sign indicates a net cost saving or net earnings in-
crease. Estimated earnings reduction excludes the response of families who are nonrecipients before
and after the reform.
Sources: Keeley et al, (1978a and 1978b). Alternative estimate from SRI International (1983).THE WORK RESPONSE 41
Analysts performing the simulations assumed that the eligible
population contained non-aged husband-wife families and female-
headed families with children. Aged and single-person families were ex-
cluded from the simulation. The negative income tax represents a
substantially different kind of reform for the three groups that would be
eligible for payments. For single-parent families, the negative income
tax would simply replace AFDC and food stamps, both of which are
already received by a high proportion of single mothers with low in-
comes. For many single-parent families, the negative income tax PaY-
ment might even be lower than the welfare benefit that it replaces. Two-
parent families with children would be more generously treated under a
negative income tax than they are under the current welfare system.
These families are eligible to receive AFDC in only about half the states,
and even in those states the program is less generous to two-parent
families than it is to single-parent families. Childless husband-wife
families would be treated far more generously under a negative income
tax than they are under the current system. Such families are currently
eligible to receive only food stamps and general assistance. General
assistance is typically far less generous than AFDC.
The first column in table 4 shows the predicted reduction in annual
hours of work among recipients of negative income tax payments. In
two-parent families the work reduction under all four plans is moderate-
ly large, ranging from 6.5 percent to as much as 20.6 percent, depending
on the characteristics of the plan and the details of the simulation. These
estimates reflect the combined responses of both husbands and wives to
the negative income tax incentives. In the first simulation there is a
tendency for the percentage reduction in hours to rise strongly with in-
creases in the guarantee and tax rate. The second simulation shows the
same pattern, but it is much weaker. Note that the second simulation
shows smaller work effort reductions than the first, particularly for
plans with a higher marginal tax rate. In spite of their differences, both
simulations show work effort reductions among husbands and wives
receiving the negative income tax payments, with fairly large percentage
reductions under the two plans that provide a poverty-line guarantee.
The two simulation programs do not conform in their predictions of
the response among single-parent families. One simulation shows
moderate to substantial hours reductions while the other shows only
small reductions or even labor supply increases. It is unlikely that the in-
consistencies are due to the differing labor supply parameters used.2°
They are probably caused by differences in the base year used and the
assumed level of pre-reform welfare benefits. (The latter difference
presumably has only a small effect in the case of husband-wife families
because these families are typically ineligible for welfare benefits under
the current system.) The striking differences in the predicted single~42 Gary Burtless
parent responses to the same negative income tax are disturbing. The
differences imply that work effort estimates are sensitive to alternative
techniques in simulation as well as to varying assumptions about
income and substitution effects.
The second column in the table shows the predicted population
response to the negative income tax plans. These predictions include
work effort changes among nonrecipients as well as recipients of
payments. The numbers in the column show the percentage changes in
population hours of work. (Note that the percentage change in popula-
tion earnings will be much smaller than the percentage hours reductions
because negative income tax recipients, who account for the work reduc-
tions, have lower wage rates than nonrecipients.) Among husband-wife
families, the population response is always much smaller in percentage
terms than the response among recipients. The reason is obvious in
view of the participation rates reported in column (3). Only a fraction of
the population receives negative income tax payments, so most
husband-wife families will be unaffected by welfare reform. (Neither of
the simulations includes a tax increase on nonrecipients to finance the
added transfer payments.) Note that the husband-wife population
response rises with increases in the guarantee level but declines with in-
creases in the marginal tax rate. That is, a 70 percent tax rate causes less
overall work reduction than a 50 percent tax rate. The explanation for
this apparently perverse result is that the participation rate in a high-tax
program will be lower than in a low-tax program that has the same in-
come guarantee. As the tax rate rises, the income cutoff point for receipt
of benefits falls. Fewer families will have incomes low enough to qualify
for payments, so fewer will be affected by the work disincentives im-
plicit in the transfer formula. The estimates in the table show a conflict
between the goal of providing work incentives to transfer recipients and
that of providing incentives to the population as a whole.21 Recipients
can be encouraged to work through a reduction in the tax rate, but such
a reduction will increase the number of recipients and hence reduce
aggregate work incentives.
The trade-off between work incentives for recipients and for the
population as a whole is also evident in the case of single mothers. Both
simulations show that aggregate work effort is greater under a high-tax
plan than under a low-tax plan with the same guarantee.22 Both simula-
tions also show that work effort among recipients is lower under the
high-tax plan than under the low-tax plan. The two simulations do not
agree, however, in predicting the sign of the overall response to a
negative income tax plan among single mothers. The first simulation im-
plies that all four negative income tax plans, including the least
generous, would reduce work effort. The second implies that the plans,
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ply among single parents. The discrepancy is due to different assump-
tions about the generosity of the existing welfare system. The second
simulation is based on the assumption that the current system is
relatively generous, so introduction of a negative income tax would
reduce benefits for a substantial fraction of current welfare recipients.23
The budgetary implications of the four negative income tax plans are
shown in column (4). The most interesting estimates are the ones for the
two plans that offer income guarantees equal to the poverty line. By
definition these plans eliminate poverty among husband-wife and
single-parent families. The more generous plan would cost $56 billion to
$61 billion more than the current welfare and food stamp programs, or
approximately 1.5 percent of GNP.24 The less generous, high-tax plan
would cost $15 billion to $26 billion more, or 0.4 to 0.6 percent of GNP.
How one views these estimates depends on one’s attitude toward redis-
tribution. A person favorably inclined toward redistribution might
regard the less expensive high-guarantee plan as a bargain: poverty is
eliminated among families containing children, and at modest cost.
Federal taxes would have to rise 2 to 4 percent to finance the plan,
however, so taxpayers less favorably inclined toward redistribution
would have ample grounds to oppose the reform, especially for
husband-wife families.
The last two columns provide evidence that might dissuade even
advocates of redistribution from suggesting a universal negative income
tax. Column (5) shows the earnings reductions in response to introduc-
tion of a negative income tax. Negative values are reported in a few
cases, implying that a negative income tax would actually increase
aggregate earnings. But most of the entries are positive, suggesting that
earnings reductions would offset at least part of the income gains to the
poor produced by a negative income tax. Column (6) shows the size of
the earnings change as a fraction of the net additional transfer cost of the
program. The fraction is especially high in the case of two-parent
families. The first simulation implies that the earnings reduction would
represent 40 to 58 percent of the added transfer costs of Ihe program for
two-parent families. The second simulation implies earnings reductions
ranging from 35 to 52 percent of net program costs, except in the case of
the least generous program, where there is a slight earnings gain.
Husbands and wives in families receiving benefits obviously "con-
sume" a high percentage of their benefits in the form of additional
leisure or other nonmarket uses of time. While the consumption of addi-
tional leisure increases the happiness of recipient families, it simulta-
neously raises the cost of payments to taxpayer donors and offsets a
large part of the intended redistributional impact of the payments. Even
more important to some taxpayers, it raises the dependence of poor two-
parent families on government transfers.44 Gary Burtless
The trade-off between earnings reductions and added transfer costs
is more favorable in the case of single mothers. Only the two plans with
a poverty-line guarantee involve substantial added costs to taxpayers.
One of the simulations shows that under these plans earnings would fall
by 16 to 20 percent of additional transfer costs, while the second shows
that single mothers’ earnings would actually rise as a result of introduc-
tion of a poverty-line guarantee. Though I am skeptical of the second set
of predictions, it seems likely that the earnings response of single
mothers would be less costly to taxpayers than the response in two-
parent families. This is suggested by the actual pattern of response in
the Seattle-Denver experiment. During the second year of that exper-
iment, the earnings reduction among single mothers was 39 percent
of the average negative income tax payment to one-parent families,
while the combined husband and wife earnings reduction was 68 per-
cent of the average payment to two-parent families.25 Given the same
payment, the net income gain to a single-parent family would be greater
than the income gain in a two-parent family. A negative income tax thus
represents a more attractive reform alternative for single-parent than for
two-parent families.
One of the main obstacles to improving the generosity of means-
tested transfers is the knowledge that more generous benefits will
reduce the earnings and self-support of the poor. The simulation results
reported in table 4 suggest that this concern is reasonable for two-parent
families, but is less valid in the case of single-parent families. Even
though the predicted work effort reduction among husbands and wives
is small, the implied reduction in earnings is a large percentage of addi-
tional transfer benefits. Using Arthur Okun’s analogy, it is obvious that
a negative income tax does not provide a leakproof redistributive
bucket.
The bucket is nonetheless more leakproof than sometimes sug-
gested in the nonexperimental literature. Edgar K. Browning and
William R. Johnson (1984) have recently argued, for example, that the
disposable money income of the top three income quintiles is depressed
by $9.51 for each one-dollar increase in money income successfully
transferred to the lowest two quintiles. It is depressed by this large
amount because transfer recipients reduce their work effort, thus in-
creasing the amount of money that must be transferred to raise their net
incomes by one dollar. In addition, Browning and Johnson’s simulations
show substantial work effort reductions among taxpayers who are faced
with higher tax rates as a result of the increased transfers.
Findings from the experiments suggest that the cost of redistributing
one dollar to the poor must be far less than $9.51. For example, estimates
in table 4 of the cost and earnings impact of the most generous negative
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an added dollar to the poor.26 This estimate ignores the labor-supply
response of taxpayers who must pay $1.89 in added taxes. If the net in-
come of these taxpayers falls by $9.51, it must be the case that their net
earnings fall by $7.62 (=9.51-1.89) in response to the higher tax rate.
Using the assumptions of Browning and Johnson, this implies that gross
earnings fall by at least $12.70.27 The labor-supply response parameters
estimated in the experiments appear inconsistent with the prediction
that annual earnings of taxpayers would decline by $12.70 in response to
a rise in net tax liabilities of only $1.89.
The experimental elasticity estimates reported in table 3 are in fact
consistent with a slight rise in taxpayers’ earnings, because the income
effect of higher taxes should more than offset the substitution effect for
most high-income families.28 This is confirmed in the only microsimula-
tion study that uses experimental labor supply parameters to predict the
responses of both transfer recipients and taxpayers to the introduction
of a negative income tax. In that simulation study, Betson, Greenberg,
and Kasten (1982) find that the combined labor supply responses of
transfer recipients and taxpayers actually cause national earnings to rise
after introduction of a negative income tax. That is, the earnings gains of
taxpayers more than offset the earnings reductions of transfer recipi-
ents.29 If this conclusion is valid, the experimental results imply that the
disposable money income of the top three income quintiles will fall by
less than $1.89 for each one-dollar increase in money income success-
fully transferred to the working-age poor.3° This estimate is, of course,
far below the estimate reported by Browning and Johnson, who based
their study on nonexperimental labor supply elasticities. The ex-
perimental results thus imply substantially lower costs to taxpayers of
income redistribution.
Conclusions
The negative income tax plans tested in the experiments were
expected to reduce work effort among participants, and they did so. The
work reductions were probably smaller than most opponents of a
negative income tax had feared, but larger than advocates had hoped. In
comparison to predictions of work effort response based on prior nonex-
perimental research, the actual response to the tested plans was small.
But the response was negative even among women previously receiving
public welfare, with all of its attendant work disincentives. The
estimates of income and substitution elasticities obtained in the ex-
periments fall well within the very broad range of estimates obtained in
nonexperimental studies. Moreover, the experimental estimates appear
to be far more robust. That is, they fall within a narrow range even when46 Gary Burtless
estimated using different samples and alternative econometric models.
With the exception of the income elasticity estimated for women, the
average experimental elasticities are lower in absolute value than cor-
responding nonexperimental estimates. In particular, the compensated
substitution elasticity is only a fraction of the average elasticity estimated
in nonexperimental studies, implying that the efficiency losses for
redistribution to the able-bodied poor would be lower than could be
predicted from the average nonexperimental estimates of response.
It has been argued, by Anderson (1978) and Murray (1984) among
others, that the findings of the experiments greatly understate the long-
run response to a negative income tax. While there is some evidence
from the experiments themselves that the long-run impact is indeed
understated, the evidence is neither as strong nor as unambiguous as
these critics argue. The permanent income effect of negative income tax
payments was almost certainly underestimated in the experiments, but
the substitution effect of the tax rates was probably overstated, at least
among wives. While it is true that participants in the experiments may
not have had time to fully adjust their labor supply to its long-run
equilibrium value, it is equally true that the experiments did not observe
the long-run response of employers to a smaller supply of low-wage
labor.31 Moreover, at least part of the apparent labor supply response in
the experiments is known to have been a reporting phenomenon rather
than a true reduction in work effort. (It is arguable whether the protec-
tions against income misreporting in a national program would be
greater or less than those available in an experiment.) Given these
potentially offsetting biases, the long-run impact of a modest negative
income tax is probably understated by no more than one-third by simple
extrapolation of the experimental results.
The estimates obtained in the experiments have a number of im-
plications for reform of the welfare system, especially reform that raises
the generosity of benefits. The findings suggest that benefit increases
would cause only moderate reductions in aggregate hours of work and
even smaller reductions in aggregate earnings. But even if the overall
work reduction is small, the resulting earnings loss among recipient
breadwinners would represent a large fraction of the higher payments
sent out to low-income families. Earnings reductions would therefore
offset a substantial part of the income gain from more generous
transfers.
The arithmetic of reform is especially melancholy in the case of two-
parent families, where earnings reductions might represent 50 to 60 per-
cent of the added cost of new transfers. A simple and moderately
generous negative income tax appears to be far more feasible for single-
parent families. The earnings response of single mothers is small or even
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ing generous benefits only to families whose earnings are less respon-
sive to work disincentives. George Akerlof (1978) has argued, for
example, that high-benefit, low-tax transfer formulas should be made
available to only the least responsive families so that benefits can be
more generously provided to those in greatest need. The results of the
experiments support Akerlof’s argument that the trade-off between
higher benefits and lower work effort would be less painful under a
system of separate transfer formulas for, one- and two-parent families.
(As Akerlof also points out, this is a fair description of the current
welfare system.) Unfortunately, such a system provides clear incentives
for families to change their composition in order to become eligible for
the more generous transfer formula.
The findings from the experiments also point up a conflict between
creating work incentives for transfer recipients and for the population as
a whole. If a major goal of a transfer formula is to provide work incen-
tives for recipients, the findings imply that relatively low tax rates are
desirable. If the goal is to reduce disincentives for the entire population,
a much higher tax rate is preferable because it minimizes the size of the
population subject to work disincentives. This trade-off is clearest in the
case of husband-wife families, where reductions in the marginal; tax rate
(given a fixed and plausible guarantee level) cause rapid increases in the
population eligible to receive benefits. For single-parent families the
trade-off is less clear since so many single mothers are eligible to receive
payments, even at low guarantee levels. Hence, reductions in the
marginal tax rate do not cause such rapid increases in the proportion of
one-parent families eligible to receive payments.
If the experiments have inspired pessimism about our ability to
reduce poverty through a system of pure cash transfers, they have also
stimulated an examination of alternatives to a negative income tax. One
way to minimize the adverse earnings effects of generous transfers is to
require recipients to work. The Carter administration proposed to do
this through a program of guaranteed public sector jobs for welfare re-
cipients who were expected to work. Recipients refusing to work would
have been denied benefits under the more generous transfer formula
and forced to rely on benefits computed under a less generous formula.
While the Carter proposal would have reduced or even eliminated the
adverse earnings impact of more generous transfers, it would have in-
volved substantial additional costs in order to finance the guaranteed
jobs program. Some of these costs can be avoided under workfare,
which essentially requires welfare recipients to work but does not pay
them anything in addition to their current welfare grant if they do so.
Recipients who decline work can have their grants reduced or
eliminated. The negative income tax experiments obviously shed little if
any light on the effects of this kind of work requirement.48 Gary Burtless
Wage subsidies and earnings subsidies represent an alternative ap-
proach to redistribution. A worker eligible for a wage subsidy receives a
transfer payment that grows rather than declines as hours of work rise.
Not only does the program redistribute income to the poor, but it offers
larger transfers to breadwinners who work longer hours. The labor sup-
ply response to wage subsidies is thus assumed to reinforce rather than
offset the direct redistributive effect of the transfer payments. The
response estimates obtained in the negative income tax experiments can
be used to predict the effects of wage subsidy plans as well as negative
income tax plans. The elasticity estimates reported in table 3 do not
appear especially encouraging for a wage or earnings subsidy scheme.
The labor supply functions estimated in the experiments are vertical or
backward-bending. Much of the response to negative income tax
payments was caused by a reliably estimated income effect. Any wage
or earnings subsidy thus has the potential to encourage work reductions
among those breadwinners who would receive the largest subsidies,
that is, those now working the longest hours. In a simulation study of
the impact of wage-rate subsidy schemes based on labor supply
estimates from the Seattle-Denver experiment, analysts have found that
subsidy plans actually reduce hours and earnings in recipient families
(Betson and Bishop, 1982). Contrary to the expectations of subsidy advo-
cates, the work response to wage subsidies--like the response to
negative income tax payments--tends to offset the direct redistributive
impact of the transfers.
The experiments have confirmed that good deeds are not costless.
Income redistribution to the poor has an efficiency price. The price is far
lower than pessimists predicted, but it certainly exceeds zero. The
reaction of policymakers and policy analysts to this set of findings is
interesting. They seem far more impressed by our certainty that the effi-
ciency price of redistribution is positive than they are by the equally
persuasive evidence that the price is small.THE WORK RESPONSE 49
1The results in table 2 were not based on an identical statistical specification across
experiments, nor were the estimation samples selected with identical criteria. The
estimates reflect the responses to negative income tax plans in the middle two years for the
New Jersey experiment, in the entire three years of the Rural and Gary experiments, and
in the second (or middle) year of the Seattle-Denver experiment. For estimates based on a
similar model and set of sample selection criteria, see Robins (1985), who reports very
similar results. I slightly prefer the results reported here because they reflect the
judgments of analysts who were most familiar with data from the individual experiments.
2See Moffitt (1979, p. 479) and Robins and West (1980b, pp. 23, 25, and 27).
3SRI International (1983) p. 177.
4The after-tax income of eligible families was raised by somewhat more than $900.
The estimated reduction in gross earnings is $1,800 but the implied reduction in net earn-
ings is probably 10 to 20 percent below that figure.
5Greenberg, Moffitt, and Friedman (1981, p. 586).
6Greenberg and Halsey (1983, pp. 400-05). In an unpublished analysis of underreport-
ing based upon earnings records from the Social Security Administration rather than the
unemployment insurance system, SR! obtained similar results. Underreporting of income
to the experiment caused a very slight overstatement of the true earnings reduction among
husbands and single mothers and a somewhat larger overstatement of the reduction
among wives in two-parent households. Some observers argue that the experiments’ ex-
perience with income misreporting is not relevant in a fully operational national program,
since a national program would have access to employer-reported earnings information,
such as that available to the Social Security Administration. While it is possible to use
Social Security and unemployment insurance administrative records to verify the earnings
reductions estimated from interview data, it would be impractical to rely on these same
administrative records to compute monthly negative income tax payments. The Social
Security Administration and state unemployment agencies obtain individual earnings
records only with a lag, which can range up to 18 months. This is clearly too long to permit
the timely calculation of negative income tax benefits. Hence, any practical system of
monthly (or bimonthly) transfer payments must rely on self-reported earnings informa-
tion, at least to some degree. For that reason, the experimental findings on income under-
reporting are applicable to a wide range of feasible welfare reform plans.
7A very small number of families was enrolled for 20 years, but this sample is probably
too small to yield useful results.
sCommittee on Ways and Means (1986), pp. 373-74.
9Office of Income Security Policy (1983), p. 6.
10To illustrate the problem, consider the earnings reduction among Seattle-Denver
husbands during the third experimental year. Men assigned to the lowest guarantee/50%
tax plan reduced their earnings by an average of $962, while men assigned to the highest
guarantee/50% tax plan reduced their earnings by only $592. An explanation for this
perplexing pattern of response is provided by the sample assignment plan. Whereas 96%
of men in the less generous plan had preexperimental income below $7,000, only 26% of
men in the more generous plan had income below that level. If we estimate the effect of
both plans separately for each preexperimental income level, we can compute what the ex-
pected responses would be in two samples with an identical income distribution. Suppose
we consider a sample that has the income distribution of the combined samples assigned
to the two negative income tax plans just mentioned. The expected response to the low
guarantee/50% tax plan is an increase in earnings equal to $753 per year, while the ex-
pected response to the high guarantee/50% tax plan is an earnings reduction of $1,994.
Both predictions are extremely imprecise because of the small number of men within par-
ticular income classes assigned to one or another of the plans. Clearly, the sampling plan
had an enormous impact on the pattern and precision of estimated responses to the two
plans.
llResults from this procedure are statistically imprecise because there are only a few
observations in each cell when all conceivable interaction effects are estimated.
12A worker typically faces a segmented linear rather than a strictly linear budget con-
straint defining the trade-off between leisure and consumption. Each linear segment is
defined by a slope (equal to the net or after-tax wage rate) and an intercept term referred to
as "virtual income." If a worker faced a strictly linear budget constraint, the intercept
would be equivalent to the amount of nonwage income to which the worker is entitled at
zero hours of work.50 Gary Burtless
13By definition, ~w and ~Y are directly correlated with preexperimental work effort
since they are defined at the preexperimental level of hours. The correlation is nonetheless
smaller than it would be in nonexperimental data.
14Strictly speaking, it would not concern us if ,’Xw, ,~Y, w, and N are correlated with
observed variables so long as those variables are included in the estimation equation. As a
practical matter, however, a high correlation between, say, w and X makes it difficult to
estimate precisely the separate effects of w and X on H.
lSThe studies are Keeley et al. (1978b), Keeley and Robins (1980), Robins and West
(1980a), Burtless and Greenberg (1982), Johnson and Pencavel (1982), SRI International
(1983), and Johnson and Pencavel (1984). Labor supply elasticities for most of these studies
are reported in Keeley (1981), pp. 159-67.
16The 21 estimates were not obtained in 21 different studies. Several studies reported
separate labor supply estimates for different racial groups. For example, both New Jersey
and Rural experimental studies often reported separate labor supply parameters for
different racial groups.
17I include all elasticities reported by Killingsworth (1983) on pp. 119-122 and pp.
193-197 from U.S. studies where it is possible to compute them. Some individual studies
provide several estimates of labor supply response; each response estimate is included
with equal weight.
18For example, the first simulation considered the response of household heads aged
18 to 58, while the second considered responses of household heads between 16 and 65.
The second simulation also used a significantly different method of imputing transfer
benefits, which had important consequences for defining the pre-reform situation of low-
income families (see below). Standard errors of the simulated national labor supply
responses are reported in SRI International (1983), p. 181.
19See Committee on Ways and Means, (1986), pp. 370-75.
20The labor supply elasticities assumed in the two simulations do not differ very much
for female heads. The uncompensated and compensated substitution elasticities and the
total income elasticity were -0.03, 0.13, and -0.15, respectively, in the first simulation;
they were -0.04, 0.17, and -0.22 in the second. For husbands, in the first simulation the
elasticities were 0.02, 0.10, and -0.08; in the second they were -0.13, 0.09, and -0.22. For
wives, in the first simulation the elasticities were 0.00, 0.22, and -0.22; in the second they
were -0.11, 0.20, and -0.31.
21See also Levy (1979) and Moffitt (1985) for a discussion of this issue.
22This corresponds to Levy’s (1979) findings with respect to AFDC but contradicts
Moffitt°s (1985) simulation of the effect of a pure negative income tax using nonexperimen-
tal labor supply elasticities.
23In fact, a majority of current single-parent welfare recipients is predicted to be worse
off under three of the four plans examined. Even the most generous plan--offering a
100-percent-of-poverty-line guarantee and 50 percent tax rate--is predicted to make more
than one-third of current welfare recipients worse off. See SRI International (1983), p. 189.
24These statements may understate the cost of a poverty-line income guarantee in the
mid 1980s. The simulations are based on population responses in the mid 1970s when the
employment rate of married and single mothers was somewhat lower. Since the labor sup-
ply response of women accounts for an important share of the net cost of a more generous
program, the budgetary impact of a negative income tax could be higher in the 1980s.
2sSRI International (1983), pp. 117 and 144.
26Table 4 contains four estimates of the net cost of guaranteeing a poverty-’line income,
two based on an assumed tax rate of 50 percent and two based on a tax rate of 70 percent.
Column 6 shows the ratio of earnings reductions to net additional budget outlays. The
highest reported ratio for the poverty-line plans is 0.47. This implies that $1.00 in addi-
tional transfer benefits causes a $0.47 reduction in earnings, suggesting that net income is
only $0.53 (or $1.00 -$0.47) higher than it would be without the additional transfers. By
implication, taxpayers must spend $1.89 to raise the net incomes of the poor by $1.00.
27The marginal tax rate in the top three income quintiles is estimated to be about 40
percent (see Browning and Johnson, 1984, p. 184). With this tax rate, a $12.70 decline in
gross wages yields a $7.62 decline in net wages.
~8Oddly, Browning and Johnson argue that their simulation predictions are consistent
with labor supply elasticities estimated in the experiments (Browning and Johnson, 1984,
pp. 190-91). In fact, Browning and Johnson’s assumed labor supply elasticities (p. 188) dif-
fer markedly from the experimental elasticities reported in table 3. The discrepancies are
especially notable in the lowest income quintile.THE WORK RESPONSE 51
29The results of this simulation are described in Betson, Greenberg, and Kasten (1982),
p. 200. For a related discussion, see Betson and Greenberg (1986). We should be cautious
in accepting simulations of the taxpayer response to tax increases that are based on
response parameters obtained in the negative income tax experiments. The experiments
enrolled low-income families; most taxes are paid by middle- and high-income families.
30We should carefully distinguish between the earnings effects of a tax increase and
the welfare or economic efficiency effects. Even though the gross earnings of taxpayers
might rise as a result of a tax increase, the welfare of such taxpayers must decline by at
least as much as the added revenue raised by the tax. Thus, even if the net income of tax-
payers falls by less than $1.89, the welfare of taxpayers must fall by more than $1.89.
Depending on the size of the compensated substitution effect and existing marginal tax
rate, the welfare loss could substantially exceed $1.89.
31In the long run, for example, wage offers by employers might be higher or the
unemployment rate among nonrecipients of a negative income tax might be lower. The lat-
ter effect would occur if negative income tax recipients and nonrecipients are in competi-
tion for a limited number of jobs.
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Orley C. Ashenfelter*
Having been commissioned to write a paper similar to the one by
Gary Burtless at a much earlier state in the development of the negative
income tax experiments (Ashenfelter 1978), I had hoped to see a major
effort to address some of the puzzles that were evident to any serious
scientist examining the early results of those experiments. I am afraid
that Burtless has passed over all of these basic issues in his apparent
determination to reach strong and definite conclusions about public
policy. The result is that Burtless’s paper is at best an incomplete
catalogue of the research that has already been done with the negative
income tax experiment data. At worst it leaves the impression that many
of the important reasons for experimentation have now disappeared.
Quite to the contrary, I believe most of the important research with
social experiments of this type remains to be done. Careful analysis of
the data already available and the design and implementation of new
and better experiments could have enormous payoffs for our under-
standing of the effects of public policies on the poor and on our
understanding of behavior in the labor market.
In order to demonstrate the veracity of my assertion in the limited
space available, I will simply take up the two most important issues that
troubled me in my review of the rural negative income tax experiment a
decade ago. These issues are, as it turns out, of fundamental importance
for the interpretation of the results of a negative income tax experiment,
and they seem to remain as unresolved now as they were a decade ago.
First, what is the size of the effect of a negative income tax on hours
worked? Burtless produces a handy table 2 that, at first blush, provides
*Professor of Economics and Director of the Industrial Relations Section, Princeton
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the answer to this question for the programs detailed in table 1. Unfortu-
nately, the data in table 2 are taken from the statements by program par-
ticipants to the survey research houses responsible for data collection in
these experiments. A key point about a negative income tax program,
however, is that, like a positive income tax, it sets up an incentive for
workers to underreport their incomes. The more they can reduce income
reported to the experimenter, the greater will be their transfer
payments.
In the reports of the New Jersey and rural negative income tax
experiments, underreporting was little discussed. As Burtless states,
there is some research on this issue in the Gary and Seattle-Denver
experiments that indicates that income underreporting is a major (and
perhaps the only) cause of the observed decline in earnings in both of
these experiments. Of course, the design of these experiments did not
incorporate the likelihood that income underreporting would be a
serious problem, so the way it is studied is indirect. In particular, earn-
ings from government administrative records are used to measure
"true" earnings and then these are compared against the survey data.
The conclusion that Burtless draws from his appraisal of the studies
of underreporting is that, "even if misreporting bias causes an exaggera-
tion of the efficiency loss from a negative income tax . . . an earnings
reduction caused by underreporting is just as costly to taxpayers as
a reduction caused by a genuine reduction in work effort." Although
Burtless is only adopting the same conclusion as many others, it seems
to me to be in serious error. After all, a genuine negative income tax pro-
gram will operate from government administrative reports on income.
Thus, payments in a genuine negative income tax program would be
based on the "true" records used by the experimenter here to establish
the extent of underreporting. Unless participants actually did change
their labor supply behavior or found a way to misreport their income to
government officials, it is possible that the additional program costs of a
genuine negative income tax scheme attributable to reductions in work
effort might be very small. Who is to say whether there would be any
labor supply response, further income underreporting, or neither, if an
experiment with conventional administrative procedures were imple-
mented? Only an experiment fully informed at the design stage about
the possibility for income underreporting, and that tested for its effect,
would shed any light on this critical issue. Sadly, the design of none of
these experiments was so informed.
A second important issue revolves around the determination of
precisely why a labor supply response is produced by a negative income
tax experiment. To economists there are effects associated with (a) the
size of the tax rate in the program and (b) the generosity of the program.
Sorting out these effects is an issue of high priority if the results of theDISCUSSION 55
experiments are to be used to predict the expected response to a pro-
gram not yet tested. No less importantly, for an economist, the incentive
effects of a negative income tax program must operate through varia-
tions in the tax rate and generosity of the program, if we are to put much
faith in the conventional models of labor supply often used to analyze
these issues.
The reports of the results of all these experiments rarely, if ever, pro-
vide simple, nonparametric two-way contrasts of labor supply behavior
by experimentals and controls. Most analysts estimate parametric
models (of the form (4) in Burtless’s paper) before providing any tabula-
tion of nonparametric results. A partial exception is the final report on
the Seattle-Denver income maintenance experiments (1983). A key find-
ing there is that simple two-way contrasts show no clear evidence that
higher tax rates are associated with higher labor supply responses than
lower tax rates. Furthermore, no clear relationship was found between
program generosity and labor supply responses. My guess is that, at
best, the reported magnitudes of income and substitution effects in
Burtless’s table 3 are based on parametric models so weakly related to
the data available that most of the results mainly reflect prior views of
the experimenter, and not the actual data. At the very least we are owed
some notion of the extent to which the data discipline these results,
rather than the prior views of those who calculated them. I find it quite
surprising that, a decade after this research was begun, it is still difficult
to find out precisely what it is that nonparametric models fit to the basic
experimental data reveal, if anything, about the nature of income and
substitution effects on labor supply.
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Robert E. Hall*
No topic could be further removed from discussion in Washington
today than a guaranteed income for all Americans, financed by a steep
tax on the first few thousand dollars of income. Instead, the whole
thrust of policy has been toward tightly limited categorical benefits
financed by low marginal rates on all earnings. Hence, the experiments
discussed by Burtless and the other authors at this conference cannot be
seen now as bearing on policy choices. Rather, they provide data points
for scientific investigations of the responses of families to changing
economic incentives. I agree strongly with the basic theme of the
Burtless paper that the main focus of research should be the incorpora-
tion of experimental data into structural labor supply estimation, and
not the evaluation of the effects of the particular plans that were the sub-
jects of the experiments.
Burtless in his paper notes the bias toward a finding of high
elasticities of labor supply in the experimental data because it was in the
interest of the subjects to understate their earnings in order to enlarge
their payments. He reviews the attempts that have been made to
measure the bias by measuring earnings from extrinsic data. In some
cases, such as the Gary experiment, most of the observed decline in
hours of work appears to be underreporting. In the Seattle-Denver ex-
periment, primary earners did not underreport but secondary earners
did. The reader is left with some unresolved questions: Why go on to
use the data that are contaminated by known underreporting later in the
paper? Why is underreporting rampant in some instances yet absent in
others, where the incentive is just as strong? As the paper stands, it ap-
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pears that labor supply responses should be studied directly with the ex-
trinsic data, ignoring the reports of the subjects themselves, or at least
that studies should be confined to those cases where the problem of
underreporting is known to be mild.
The experimental data dramatically improve the variation in the
right-hand variables in labor supply estimation. Moreover, thanks to
random assignment, the variation is fully exogenous. Hence, both the
bias and the randomness of estimated labor supply elasticities are
smaller with experimental data than with survey data. In this respect,
the scientific value of the experiments has been enormous.
Before looking at the labor supply findings, Burtless considers the
biases that arise from the temporary nature of the experiments. He notes
that adjustment costs and temporary income subsidies cause the ex-
perimental data to understate the long-run effect on labor supply, but
that intertemporal substitution causes the data to overstate the long-run
effect. His conclusion is that the net effect is an understatement of the
response, but I see this as an unsettled issue.
For men, Burtless observes that econometric work has almost
universally found that both the substitution and income responses of
labor supply are substantially smaller in the experimental data than in
survey data. That observation confirms the misgivings that veterans of
labor supply estimation in survey data have always had--wages and
preferences favoring work are positively correlated in the population.
The cross-sectional labor supply function has a positive wage elasticity
even if the labor supply function of each individual has zero elasticity.
The comparison of two men, one earning $10 per hour and the other $5,
shows the former working more hours than the latter. Conclusions
about the labor supply functions of either of the men are hard to reach.
On the other hand, in the experimental data, we can study a man earn-
ing $10 per hour before the experiment, who starts paying a 50 percent
tax and hence faces a decline in his wage to $5 per hour. His decline in
hours of work is unambiguously a measure of his labor supply elasticity.
For women, the results collected by Burtless show much smaller
substitution responses in the experimental data than in the survey data,
by an order of magnitude. The high substitution elasticities found in
survey data for women are apparently the result of an even higher cor-
relation between wages and preferences favoring work than is the case
for men. However, the income responses in the experimental data are
larger than those found in survey data, the opposite of what is found for
men.
Burtless goes on to apply the labor supply findings to evaluate the
effects of possible negative income tax programs for the U.S. economy.
As I mentioned at the outset, this exercise is of relatively minor impor-
tance, since no plan of this type has any chance of active consideration,58 Robert E. Hall
but still it is an interesting way to draw out the implications of the labor
supply findings. One of the interesting things we learn as part of the
exercise is that the biggest uncertainty about the effect of a move to a
negative income tax as a replacement for state-administered welfare pro-
grams is the economic characterization of those programs, not the
elasticities of labor supply. From the point of view of his table 4, it is just
as important to carry out research on benefit levels and implicit tax rates
for the existing systems in 51 states as it is to process data from the
experiments.
In table 4 and earlier in the paper, Burtless invites evaluation of
negative income tax programs in terms of the ratio of earnings reduc-
tions to "costs." I find this type of calculation a mystery. A negative in-
come tax is a lump-sum benefit (a demo-grant) paid to every family,
financed in part by a tax at a high rate on the first few thousand dollars
of earnings of all workers and in part by the general tax system. The cost
in terms of resources--government purchases of goods and services--is
zero. We could also talk about the cost in the sense of the deadweight
burden of the tax, but this is not what Burtless does. Yet another sense
of the cost would be the total amount of the lump-sum benefits paid to
all families. Again, this is not what he considers. Rather, he makes an
economically arbitrary distinction between the revenue raised by the
new tax on earnings and the revenue from the existing tax. The "cost" is
the difference between the lump-sum benefits and the revenue from the
new part of the tax. I cannot see any economic sense in which this is a
cost.
Burtless seeks some kind of normalization of the aggregate earnings
reduction so that it can be expressed as a percent rather than a total
dollar amount. However, his choice of normalization, the "cost," is
small, because most negative income tax plans generate most of the
revenue needed to finance their lump-sum benefits from their own
taxes. Hence his normalized earnings effects are very large. A much
superior normalization, in my view, is simply the total amount of earn-
ings. In other words, the percent reduction in earnings is the best nor-
malized way to express the magnitude of the earnings reduction.
An important finding of Burtless’s study and many earlier ones is
that there is a positive relation between the tax rate and total work effort,
even though each worker’s labor supply function has a negative relation
between his tax rate and his work effort. The reason is that a higher tax
rate means that a smaller fraction of workers are subject to the tax. This
finding was the explicit rationalization for welfare changes introduced in
the early 1980s, when implicit tax rates for the welfare system were
raised dramatically.
Burtless notes but does not stress the cruel dilemma of income
supplements--under a straight negative income tax, most of the benefitsDISCUSSION 59
go to two-parent families, yet correcting this inequality strongly sub-
sidizes the splitting up of families. Since the conference failed to resolve
the central question of the impact of welfare and negative income tax in-
centives on family splitting, it is hard to know how to balance the two
goals of helping the neediest most and providing incentives for intact
families.
In this paper, Burtless has done a commendable job in bringing
together the results of a huge body of research and reducing it to its
essential elements.